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1. Introduction 
The creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) was a unique event in history: eleven coun-
tries gave up essential competences in the field of monetary policy in order to introduce a single 
common currency, called Euro. While the European Central Bank (ECB) was established, the na-
tional central banks did not disappear. On the contrary, all central banks of EMU had to be granted 
institutional independence. Together with the ECB, the national central banks (NCBs) of all EU 
member states constitute the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). The NCBs of the EU 
countries that have adopted the Euro and the ECB constitute the so-called "Eurosystem". The gov-
ernors of the NCBs of the Eurozone and the members of the Executive Board of the ECB define the 
monetary policy in EMU. The policy is implemented by the latter and by the NCBs. So, the conduct 
of the European monetary policy is highly complex. 
 According to the Treaty on EC, the primary objective of the ESCB is to maintain price stability. 
But generally, even independent central banks do not conduct monetary policy without taking other 
economic objectives like high employment into consideration. The outcome of monetary policy de-
pends to a great extent on fiscal policies pursued in a country. In countries like the USA or Japan, 
the central bank has to communicate with one fiscal authority that is responsible for a large share of 
public expenditures and tax receipts. In EMU, the budget of the European Community is negligible; 
about 98 per cent of governments' expenditures are spent by national or even subnational bodies 
(OECD, 2000, 73). So, in Euroland, the European monetary authorities must deal with at least 
eleven independent fiscal authorities. How can the fiscal interests of the EMU member states be 
channelled? 
 At first sight, the Economic and Financial Council (ECOFIN) seems to be the ideal body. But 
this solution ignores the fact that this council is composed of finance ministers from all EU member 
states, regardless whether they take part in EMU ("ins") or not ("outs"). The framers of the Maas-
tricht Treaty presumed all EU member states to join the monetary union sooner or later. Thus, no 
official political institutions were established consisting of EMU member states only. 
 The ECOFIN council is important for the ESCB not only because of the possible coordination 
between monetary and fiscal policies. It is also an essential legislative body, deciding e.g. on secon-
dary law concerning monetary instruments (such as the regulation on minimum reserve require-
ments). It is empowered to take decisions in the field of exchange-rate policy and of the movement 
of capital flows between the EU and third countries. The adoption of a formal exchange-rate ar-
rangement and measures taken to restrict international capital flows have great influence on the 
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scope for monetary actions to be taken by the Eurosystem. Thus, the ECOFIN council, too, can be 
seen as an important part of the complex European monetary architecture. 
 The institutional framework for monetary policy in Euroland consists of various elements: The 
Treaty establishing the EC, the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB, legal acts adopted by the 
ECOFIN council and the ECB, as well as formal and informal rules observed by the decision-
making bodies. As already mentioned, the conduct of monetary policy depends also on other poli-
cies such as labour market policy, wage policy and fiscal policy. In the EU, these policies are often 
implemented by national and subnational institutions. Labour market rigidities, wage inflexibilities etc. 
could also be seen as part of the institutional framework for European monetary policy. 
 I will confine myself to institutional aspects concerning the design of the ESCB, to questions 
with regard to an appropriate political counterweight to the ECB, and to the relationship between 
the ESCB and the political decision-making body ECOFIN (or its sub-body Euro 11). There are 
several reasons for this confinement: 
(1) The impact that e.g. rigidities on labour markets have on monetary policy is less direct than the 
impact of e.g. exchange-rate policy. 
(2) Most fields of economic policy remain in the competence of member states and cannot easily 
be regulated on Union level. 
(3) According to some critics, the institutional framework even in a very narrow sense shows many 
faults, which are inter alia blamed for the external weakness of the European currency.1) 
 
2. Institutional Problems inside the ESCB 
2.1. Size and Composition of the Governing Council 
The Governing Council of the ECB is the primary decision-making body in the field of monetary 
policy in EMU. It comprises the six members of the Executive Board and the 11 (soon 12) gover-
nors of all national central banks of the ins. Compared with the Open Market Committee of the US 
Fed, the number of members in that body is fairly high. According to some ECB watchers, the size 
of the Governing Council is already too large for free discussion and effective decision taking (Fav-
ero et al., 2000a, 70). Willem Buiter (1999, vii, 20), a former member of the Bank of England's 
Monetary Policy Committee, proposes to restrict its size to no more than nine members, no more 
than four of them belonging to the Executive Board. But members of the Governing Council such as 
the President of the Netherlands Central Bank, Wellink, do not see any problems even enlarging this 
body up to 21 persons in the case of an expansion of EMU to the outs and find even 25 members 
acceptable, when some Eastern European countries will join the monetary union (Tigges, 2000, 11). 
 Closely connected with the size of the Governing Council is the composition of this body. Ac-
cording to the Treaty, the governors of the NCBs are not representatives of their countries, but have 
to act in full independence. No institution is allowed to give any instructions to the governors when 
they are exercising their tasks as members of the Governing Council. Each of them has - like each of 
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the members of the Executive Board - one vote. Critics of this structure see the danger that the gov-
ernors of NCBs try to pursue national interests (Begg et al., 1998, 4 ff.). The latters outnumber con-
siderably the members of the Executive Board, who are assumed to pursue EMU interests. So, 
there is an asymmetrical power structure: the Executive Board as the centre of the Governing Coun-
cil and of the ECB is weak, while the governors of the constituent NCBs are strong. The monetary 
policy might be dominated by national interests. Then, the Executive Board primarily has to execute 
the decisions taken by the Governing Council, and to a lesser extent to initiate and prepare those 
decisions. Furthermore, the Governing Council can also decide on proposals introduced by the 
Governors of the NCBs. Unlike the European Commission, the Executive Board does not have the 
exclusive right to initiate policy measures (Bini Smaghi, Gros, 2000, 7). Because of conflicts be-
tween national interests, inertia in policy formulation is seen as a consequence of the power-sharing 
inside the Governing Council (Begg et al., 1998, 5). The position of the NCB governors is strength-
ened by the frequent meetings of the Governing Council. It meets every two weeks, while the Stat-
ute of the ECB demands at least ten meetings a year only. So, there is much less need to delegate 
certain powers to the Executive Board. The continuing lack of current statistical data on a European 
(or better: Euroland) level (Kuls, 2000, 15 f.) contributes to an information asymmetry, which further 
weakens the Executive Board's position in relation to the NCB governors, who know national data. 
 The argument that NCB governors pursue national interests when taking decisions on the Gov-
erning Council is opposed by many central bankers and economists. Empirical evidence shows that 
even those who demanded excessive monetary policy to reflate the economy when they were mem-
bers of the government, generally change their mind on becoming a member of a central bank 
(Jochimsen, 1999, 52). So it can be expected that the NCB governors in the ECB Governing 
Council refrain from pursuing national interests as well as in Germany or the USA, where the gover-
nors from the regional central banks do not (in the case of Germany: did not) subordinate the econ-
omy-wide goals to specific regional interests. This being conceded, critics assert that the regional 
adherence of, e.g., a governor of a Fed district bank in the USA is far less distinct than the national 
adherence in Europe (Begg et al., 1998, 6). But the "Becket effect"2) may nevertheless occur be-
cause members of a decision-making body take into account how their voting is perceived by the 
other members. So, the pursuit of national interests is less likely to occur. And even outspoken euro-
sceptics must concede that NCB governors have voted more than once on the Governing Council 
against the interests of their home countries and in favour of the interests of the Eurozone as a whole 
(Shirreff, 2000, 102). But the no-decision taking or the late-decision taking might be regarded as a 
pursuit of national interests, too. Up to now all decisions of the Governing Council seem to have 
been taken on the consensus principle, although it is criticized even by members of the Board (Pa-
doa-Schioppa, 2000). And obeying this principle might give even more weight to employment and 
growth goals: Some NCB governors, having those goals in mind, tend to agree immediately with 
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proposals to lower interest rates. They agree with proposals to raise interest rates only when infla-
tion pressure has already increased considerably. In the spring of this year, it was criticized that a 
raise in interest rates was delayed, weakening or at least not strengthening the external value of the 
European currency. This can be regarded as a kind of export promotion policy, which is advanta-
geous to some countries like Italy, where many firms compete with suppliers from outside EMU 
(Berni, 2000). But it is also possible that the NCB governors overemphasize the anti-inflation goal 
(Bini Smaghi, Gros, 2000, 14 f.). Even those from countries known as inflation-prone in the past 
now give high priority to that aim and cast their votes for raising interest rates when inflation pressure 
is high in their home country,3) even if price stability is achieved in the EMU area as a whole.4) Until 
now, it is impossible to observe the priorities of the NCB governors, for the minutes of the ECB 
meetings are not published. In either case, at least for some periods, national interests seem to have 
the upper hand over Eurozone interests.5) 
 That is why changes in size and composition of the Governing Council are repeatedly de-
manded in order to strengthen the Executive Board. According to the "counter-centralization propo-
sition" of von Hagen/Süppel, the monetary policy decision-making body should be centralized due to 
the fact that fiscal and political power in EMU is highly decentralized (von Hagen, Süppel, 1994, 
779). Some observers prefer a majority of the Executive Board members in the Governing Council 
like in the Fed (e.g. Begg et al., 1998, 8), others want only to reduce the majority of the NCB gov-
ernors (e.g. Buiter, 1999, vii). In both cases, not all national central banks, which are constituents of 
the ESCB, would have a vote in the Governing Council. This would involve the introduction of re-
volving terms for NCB governors, like those of the governors of district banks in the US Fed. How-
ever, especially in EMU there are some reasons for a sort of representation of all member countries 
in the ECB's Governing Council. There are still differences in the financial structures in Europe 
(OECD, 2000, 63 f.), which should be taken in consideration when the appropriate monetary policy 
is discussed. And the rate of acceptance of the new single common currency might be lower in 
countries which are not represented in the Governing Council when Euro-notes and Euro-coins are 
introduced. Above all, the Treaty on EC would have to be revised to abolish the principle that each 
EMU member has one seat in the Governing Council. And that seems very unlikely to happen. 
 But the power of the Executive Board in formulating and conducting monetary policy in EMU 
could be strengthened compared with the current situation without any revision of the Treaty or the 
Statute. According to the Statute, normally a simple majority is sufficient when taking monetary pol-
icy decisions. If it can be assumed that the Executive Board members vote unanimously and a third 
of the NCB governors share their opinion, then the Executive Board is able to carry through its pol-
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icy plans not only under the present circumstances, but even in the case of an EMU enlargement up 
to 20 countries. Replacing the consensus principle with the majority principle would also contribute 
to a faster decision taking. Many euro-critics reproach the ECB for having acted too slowly in rais-
ing and lowering interest rates.  
 The crucial question is, why it can be assumed that at least a third of the NCB governors ap-
prove the proposals of the Executive Board, which would be necessary to outweigh the Board's mi-
nority. The Executive Board is supposed to vote on EMU average economic data. Even when it is 
assumed that no NCB governor pursues the interests of EMU as a whole, but pursues his national 
interests, it can be expected that the governors of countries with a national macroeconomic devel-
opment like that of EMU average tend to support the Executive Board. But the macroeconomic de-
velopment in EMU is still dominated by a few countries, so one cannot be sure that the depicted 
scenario will occur. The weighted average of national economic data, representing the true economic 
development of EMU, when the weights are chosen in respect of the size of the member states, 
might diverge considerably from the simple average of national data, the latter average correspond-
ing to the one-member one-vote principle in respect to the NCB governors (Bini Smaghi, Gros, 
2000, 14 f.). And even if the majority principle is applied, it is hard to believe that decisions are 
taken with a small majority (e.g. 9:8). Besides that, there might be policy decisions which give the 
economic developments in some countries excessive weights (Favero et al., 2000a, 38), perhaps 
because international financial markets regard these countries as the indicators of the pan-EMU de-
velopments. 
 Without reducing the number of the Governing Council members the Executive Board's position 
could be strengthened by formal or informal rules (Vollmer, 1999, 308). For example, one can 
imagine that proposals of the Executive Board need a large majority to be rejected.  
 Sometimes, decreasing the size of the Governing Council is also proposed to avoid central 
bankers expressing divergent opinions to the public. The lack of "one voice" has been blamed for the 
external weakness of the Euro. But it is quite doubtful whether this aim can be attained in this way: 
(1) Even small monetary committees fail to speak with one voice and do not give clear signals to 
the markets (Issing, 1999, 10 f., The Economist, 2000a). 
(2) Some members even of the ECB's Executive Board think that a public discussion on monetary 
aspects is no problem at all (Padoa-Schioppa, 2000). 
(3) Even national central bankers without any responsibility for European monetary policy give 
statements e.g. on the ECB's interest rate decisions. So Klaus-Dieter Kühlbacher, the president 
of the Landeszentralbank (regional central bank) of Berlin and Brandenburg and in this capacity 
also member of the Bundesbank's central council, was quoted in the press on interest rates 
(Shirreff, 2000, 106). But the Bundesbank's Governor is absolutely independent relative to the 
Bundesbank's Council, when he casts his vote in the ECB Governing Council. The national 
central bankers in EMU must yet learn their new functions. This is a special aspect of the gen-
eral problem dividing tasks and responsibilities between ECB and NCBs. 
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2.2. The Relationship between the ECB and the NCBs 
The adoption of the monetary policy strategy, the choice of the instruments, and the setting of inter-
est rates, in one short word: the monetary policy-making decisions, are the concern of the ECB. So, 
on the one hand, the Eurosystem is a one-tier system. On the other hand, it is a two-tier system, for 
the task of implementing the monetary policy is shared by the Executive Board and the NCBs. Ac-
cording to Article 12 of the Statute, the NCBs carry out monetary operations "[t]o the extent 
deemed possible and appropriate". The decentralized implementation of the common monetary pol-
icy might cause several problems. 
 With the exception of foreign-exchange interventions all monetary operations have to be settled 
through the NCBs (Bini Smaghi, Gros, 2000, 17 ff.). Commercial banks must hold their minimum 
reserves with the appropriate NCB and they get liquidity from it. The Eurosystem has to grant cred-
its to commercial banks only against adequate collateral. There are two kinds of eligible collateral 
assets: EMU-wide standardized "tier-one assets" and "tier-two assets", which are used in some 
countries only and selected by the NCBs. Although tier-two assets as the German "Wechsel" (a 
trade bill) can be used in each EMU country, they are almost never used as cross-border collateral 
(Favero et al., 2000a, 14 f.). The use of those assets does not contribute to an integration of the 
Euro money market.  
 Some functions are performed in the ESCB by either the ECB or the NCBs or - as holding 
foreign reserve assets - by the ECB and the NCBs. Beside those monetary policy functions the 
NCBs may also perform other functions. These functions may interfere with the monetary policy and 
therefore affect the relationship between ECB and NCBs. Among these functions is the responsibil-
ity for banking supervision and financial stability. In acting as lender of last resort, actions of the 
NCBs affect the money supply in EMU. But a two-thirds majority in the Governing Council would 
be necessary to declare functions incompatible with the aims and tasks of the ESCB. It is uncertain 
whether a coordination of national supervision policies is sufficient to prevent an EMU-wide financial 
crisis. But only a decision, unanimously taken  by the ECOFIN council, can give the ECB some au-
thority in the field of banking supervision. The Treaty would have to be amended to give the ECB 
general responsibility for those tasks, which are now, at least in some countries, responsibilities of 
the NCBs. One can expect that those asymmetries will continue for a long time. 
 Another asymmetry between the ECB and the NCBs is the size of the staff with analytical and 
research functions. Most of the staff is employed by the NCBs. Some NCBs of the smaller coun-
tries even increased the number of their staff. Their staff is now responsible for providing statistical 
and research support to their respective governor. In the past there was not any need for sophisti-
cated analytical work when those countries were targeting an exchange rate (Buiter, 1999, 22 f.). 
The Executive Board was able to increase its staff in the first two years, although some NCBs were 
reluctant to agree to the planned expansion (e.g. Stark, 1999). As staffing affects the budget of the 
ECB, the NCB governors have to approve the staffing proposals of the Executive Board, which has 
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no voting right on budgetary matters (Smaghi, Gros, 2000, 7 f.). Not until January 2000, the impor-
tant directorate for statistics was upgraded to a directorate-general and deficits still remain in the 
field of economic statistics on EMU level (ECB, 2000). This can be seen as a sign of NCB gover-
nors' preference for a bottom-up flow of analysed data. The existence of independent NCB statisti-
cal and research departments apart from respective ECB departments intensifies the competition 
among them and provides "useful safeguards against intellectual 'democratic centralism'" (Buiter, 
1999, 26). It does not make centralized analysing of data superfluous. 
 
3. Political Bodies in the Field of Monetary Policy 
3.1. The Role of ECOFIN and other EC Councils  
The ECB is the most important monetary policy body in EMU. It is granted high degrees of finan-
cial, institutional, personal and instrumental independence. This independence is of course not an ab-
solute one, not only because the European central bankers are appointed by political institutions, but 
also because of the legislative power of the ECOFIN council concerning some monetary instru-
ments. So the basis for minimum reserves, the maximum permissible ratios between minimum re-
serves and their basis and the kind of sanctions in the case of non-compliance had to be defined by 
the ECOFIN council, although on a recommendation from the ECB. The assent of the European 
Parliament was not required. Now the ECB can adopt minimum reserve policy within the frame-
work designed by the ECOFIN council. The same procedure applies to the transfer of foreign re-
serve assets from the NCBs to the ECB. The limits within which these assets can be transferred are 
to be set by the ECOFIN council. In other cases, ECOFIN can amend the Statute, on a recom-
mendation from the ECB or on a proposal from the Commission, only with the assent of the Euro-
pean Parliament. In all cases the decisions are taken by an institution of the EC, not by an EMU 
body. Does that mean that the "...EuroGroup ministers are not masters in their own house", as The 
Economist stated some weeks ago (The Economist, 2000b)? It is true that only ECOFIN (or more 
general: the Council) is a legislative body, even in cases regarding matters that are relevant only in 
the Euro area. But the voting rights of the outs are suspended for some council decisions concerning 
e.g. measures against member countries with excessive government deficits, exchange-rate arrange-
ments and the appointment of the members of the Executive Board. The outs do have voting rights, 
when the council takes decisions on e.g. minimum reserves and the transfer of foreign reserve assets, 
although these decisions do not have any effect on the NCBs of the outs. They can participate in de-
signing secondary law and the framework they have to observe after adopting the Euro in the fore-
seeable future. Taking part in the decision-making process is of essential importance when regula-
tions are path-dependent. That means e.g., whether a monetary policy instrument is used or not in 
the future might depend on an accidental majority in the decision-making body in the initial period. 
Even if an enlarged EMU would have taken another decision, it is unlikely that such decisions will be 
revoked after those countries will have joined EMU. This outcome can be avoided by giving voting 
rights to the soon-members. This solution tends to respect the preferences of the future EMU in a 
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better way than limiting the voting rights to present members. 
 As already mentioned, the outs do not have voting rights on all matters. Can a clear and rea-
sonable distinction be identified between having voting rights and not having voting rights? On the 
one hand, it seems reasonable to exclude the outs from the appointment of the Executive Board 
members. Soon after four years, one member of this body will have to be replaced for the first time, 
and on that occasion then new members will be allowed to give their votes on the successor. So, the 
exclusion of present non-members in that case does not cause real difficulties. On the other hand 
outs do not vote on matters of the EC's exchange-rate policy, although they would be included in 
existing arrangements when joining EMU. In practice, this does not cause difficulties either, because 
a formal exchange-rate agreement for the Euro in relation to non-Community currencies is improb-
able. The ECOFIN council may alter general orientations for exchange-rate policy by a qualified 
majority. This provision gives new members a real chance to influence exchange-rate matters. 
 Whether it is rational or acceptable at all to give the outs legislative power on matters which do 
not apply to them at the moment, depends first on the duration of their special status. The voting 
right of states with a real temporary derogation ("pre-ins" in the true sense of the word) can be ac-
cepted for the reasons set out above. This argument does not apply to states which do not intend to 
join EMU or which will stay outside for a long time because they do not comply with the conver-
gence criteria (Smits, 1997, 507). This could be the case for most of the states in Middle and East-
ern Europe when they join the EU in a few years. 
 A second aspect is, whether unanimity or qualified majority is required in taking decisions. In 
the case of unanimity, an out having the right to vote would be able to hamper the ins, even if all of 
them want to take action. Unanimity is required e.g. when the ECOFIN council intends to confer 
specific tasks concerning banking supervision upon the ECB. It is not yet clear whether all ins want 
to do that, either because they prefer a separate authority or because they prefer national institutions. 
But it is quite clear that the UK does not want the ECB to be responsible for banking supervision, 
so this country (as an out) might hinder the ins to create new responsibilities for the ECB. Some 
economists consider this shift of competences necessary for a good functioning of European mone-
tary policy. Here, the dividing line between topics on which the outs do or do not have the right to 
vote has not been drawn in an optimal manner. 
 Having voting rights suspended must be distinguished from not being represented in a decision-
making body. Of course, all EU member states take part in ECOFIN and other councils. Even if 
their voting rights are suspended, outs have influence on the decision-making process by discussing, 
making proposals etc. Due to the log-rolling in the voting on several matters, their opinions are not 
irrelevant to those having the right to vote. So it makes a big difference whether the voting rights for 
some states are suspended or whether the states with voting rights form a decision-making body of 
their own. 
 
3.2. Euro 11  
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Having in mind the outlined possible influence of the outs, even when not entitled to vote, the desire 
of the ins for a body of their own is understandable. During the Luxembourg summit in December 
1997, a resolution was passed, admitting the finance ministers of the ins to meet informally, the 
ECOFIN council remaining the decision-making body. So we have quite different situations on the 
side of central banks and on the side of politics: In the ESCB, the central banks of the countries not 
adopting the common single currency are excluded from the primary decision-making body; they 
have a seat (and a vote) only in the ECB's General Council. Its role is in the first place an advisory 
one. It can take decisions only on matters of minor importance. On the side of politics, the ins and 
outs constitute the decision-making body; the caucus of the ins, called "Euro 11", is only a discussion 
forum. Of course, this discussion may lead to a common position and a bloc-voting of all ins in the 
ECOFIN council. An agreement of the ins to vote en bloc in the ECOFIN council would ensure the 
qualified majority of Euro 11. Even if Euro 11 applied the two-thirds majority principle, free voting 
casts in the ECOFIN council could miss this majority by a wide margin.  
 Especially France, but also some other states wanted to enhance the role of Euro 11 from the 
very beginning of EMU. According to the first French plans, Euro 11 should serve as a European 
"economic government" and act as a political counterweight to the ECB. Because of the negative re-
action of the markets, fearing that the independence of the ECB could be reduced, most countries 
abandoned this idea (The Economist, 2000b). A few weeks ago France, presiding at the ECOFIN 
council in the second half of this year, made every effort to revive some parts of its original plan. 
Euro 11 is now called "Euro Group"6), its meetings now do not begin just a few hours before the 
ECOFIN council starts but on the evening before, and its chairperson gives more political state-
ments (The Economist, 2000e).  
 This formal strengthening of the Euro Group was facilitated by the fact that the weakening of the 
Euro was accompanied by divergent political statements (OECD, 2000, 61 f., The Economist, 
2000d). Many politicians as well as many economists saw the need for "one voice" on exchange-
rate matters in EMU. Due to the relative strong Pound Sterling and the relative strong Swedish 
krona, the ECOFIN council, representing the Euro as well as those currencies, could not be ex-
pected to deliver a clear-cut manifestation on exchange rates to the markets. So, the first statement 
of the Euro Group was on exchange-rate matters, but it did not impress the financial markets (The 
Economist, 2000b).  
 In general, as far as there are common interests between the ins, but divergent interests be-
tween ins and outs, declarations of Euro 11 might be more credible than those of ECOFIN. Thus, a 
closer cooperation between the ins might be beneficial for Eurozone. But some countries intend to 
change the division of responsibilities between politics and ESCB. The strengthening of the Euro 
Group might be a step to achieve this aim.  
                         
6 Not to be confused with the "private" Euro Group, consisting of former central bankers and former high-
ranked politicians as well as present members of the European financial community (Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, 2000). The term "Euro 11" would not be correct any longer, for now also the Greek minister attends 
the meetings even before the admission of Greece to EMU in January 2001. 
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4. The Assignment of Tasks 
4.1. Setting the Inflation Target 
Compared with other central banks, the ECB has a great degree of goal independence. The Treaty 
and the Statute state only that its objective is to maintain price stability. This goal is not quantified, 
neither in the Treaty nor in the Statute. It is to the ECB's Governing Council to put this goal in a nu-
merical target. The ECB has done so in defining price stability as a rise of the harmonised index of 
consumer prices below 2 per cent per year. The stability-oriented monetary policy strategy of the 
ECB is based on two pillars, a preannounced reference value for the growth of the monetary aggre-
gate M3 and a broadly defined assessment of monetary developments with regard to price stability.  
 There might be situations in which one pillar gives signals for expanding money supply, while the 
other gives contrary signals. So, the ECB has to explain monetary policy decisions more in detail 
than in the case of one target. The communication of the ECB regarding its two-pillar strategy did 
not always succeed. This has to be kept in mind when we look at some proposals concerning a re-
duction of the ECB's goal independence.  
 Especially the French minister of finance, but also some economists, would like to give the 
competence of fixing the inflation target to a politically accountable institution. Some, as the French 
minister Fabius, prefer Euro 11, while other prefer the ECOFIN council or - after a reform - the 
European Parliament (Favero et al., 2000a, 70 f.). The ECB's monetary policy would then become 
a mere technical matter, similar to some other countries where the target inflation rate is set by the 
government. Proponents of this sharing of tasks argue, that "[s]uch reform would contribute to fewer 
national tensions in policy-making" (Favero et al., 2000a, 70). But the contrary might be true, and in 
all probability the priority of price stability would be reduced in certain economic circumstances. 
There is no reason why a goal-independent ECOFIN council should perform better than a goal-
independent ECB.  
 
4.2. The Responsibility for Exchange-Rate Policy 
Without reducing the formal independence of the ECB, its actual independence could be reduced by 
exchange-rate arrangements. Therefore the Treaty states that such arrangements or orientations for 
exchange-rate policy have to be consistent with the objective of price stability. Whereas the provi-
sions of the Treaty with regard to formal arrangements are clear, those concerning general orienta-
tions are less clear (Favero et al., 2000b, 7). They give finance ministers the opportunity to talk 
about appropriate exchange rates and even to propose exchange-rate target zones (Buiter, 1999, 
9). The ECOFIN council has not given any general orientations yet. In a report to the European 
Council in December 1997, the ministers announced that they will give such orientations in excep-
tional circumstances only (ECB, 1999a, 41). However, nobody knows when these circumstances 
are considered to have set in and whether the ECB is entitled to suspend interventions when price 
stability is in danger. A legally binding, clear self-restraint of the ECOFIN council could give an un-
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ambiguous signal to the markets, ensuring the independence of the ECB as in the ERM II. Accord-
ing to this formal agreement, the ECB and the NCBs have the right to initiate a procedure to realign 
the central rates (Issing, 2000, 147). 
 
5. Conclusions   
The institutional framework for monetary policy in EMU fulfils the prerequisites which are necessary 
to secure the independence of the ECB and the NCBs and to give price stability unambiguous prior-
ity. But the framework does not automatically guarantee this independence and price stability. There 
are some potential loopholes to undermine a stability-oriented monetary policy. Institutional reforms 
could remove these loopholes and could make monetary policy more efficient. But also the contrary 
might occur as a result of institutional reforms: a less clear assignment of tasks, less political inde-
pendence of the ECB, a less stability-oriented monetary policy. The differences between the mem-
ber states concerning goals and institutions of EMU which could be observed in the late eighties and 
the early nineties might reappear. Deep monetary integration in the European Union was made pos-
sible by the special economic and political circumstances prevailing in the early nineties which con-
tributed to suppress those differences (Swann, 1995, 236).  
 The institutional framework for monetary policy in the EU will change in the future as did the 
framework for other common policies in the past. The structure of national central banks, which 
were highly decentralized in their beginnings, changed over time. So, in the first years of the 
Deutsche Mark, the German central bank system was even more decentralized than the Eurosystem 
is today.7) The Bundesbank was built up in 1957, nine years after the introduction of the new Ger-
man currency. It took until the German reunification to give up the system with a regional Main Of-
fice, known as land central bank, in each Bundesland (German state), the respective president of 
which is member of the Bundesbank's central council. It took even more time to reduce the size of 
the council. 
 Finally, an enlargement of the EU will make some changes in the institutional framework neces-
sary. Perhaps the ongoing economic and political integration will make such reforms easier. One can 
imagine that the European Parliament will gain influence on the appointment of the members of the 
ECB's Governing Council. One can also imagine that an independent financial market supervision 
authority will be established, which in the beginning will have the task of facilitating information ex-
change and coordinating measures. An independent European Council of Economic Advisers, as 
                         
7 The Bundesbank is often referred to as the model for the ECB. But its predecessor, the Bank deutscher Laen-
der (BdL), seems more fitting in some respects. The constituents of the BdL were the legally independent regi-
onal central banks of the states of the Federal Republic of Germany. Their governors were appointed by the 
respective state government and formed with the president of the Governing Council and the president of the 
Executive Board the Governing Council of the BdL. The regional central banks were even more independent 
than the NCBs in the ESCB. The fixings and changings of interest rates, which were decided in the Governing 
Council, did not come into force automatically in West-Berlin, but had to be approved by the Berlin central 
bank for its district. Of course, in a unified market, differences in interest rates could not exist for a long time, 
so generally the same rates were adopted by all regional central banks (Jochimsen, 1999, 49 f.). A formal aspect 
may also show their position: the president of the Governing Council was not at the same time president of the 
Executive Board; both were elected by the governors of the regional central banks. 
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proposed by Siebert (2000, 17), could act as an audience for the ECB to explain its policy. Such a 
council would far less be suspected of trying to undermine the independence of the ECB than e.g. 
the Euro Group. 
 At the moment, the institutional framework for monetary policy is certainly not ideal, but it is 
suitable for a good performance. EMU is still under construction, and the future will show whether 
some parts of the monetary architecture are stable or not. In the past, the EU did not always prove 
to be able to react to a changing economic environment, which makes changes in the institutional 
framework necessary. International financial markets will urge a change of inappropriate institutions, 
so the EU should be prepared. But this does not mean that proposals on institutional change should 
be launched every week. A new currency needs a stable framework, even if it is only a second-best 
framework. Albeit not optimal, the present framework for European monetary policy is workable.  
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